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The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The
Reporters' Overview
By Donald J. Weidner and John W. Larson*
INTRODUCTION
This Article is a brief overview of what the Reporters believe to be the
four basic contributions of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA
or Act).' First, RUPA changes the law of partnership breakups and gives
greater stability to partnerships by abandoning the traditional rule that a
partnership is dissolved every time a member leaves. Second, RUPA makes
clear that partners are not fiduciaries among themselves in the same sense
as disinterested trustees. Specifically, RUPA states that partners legiti-
mately may pursue self-interest without automatically running afoul of
their fiduciary duties. On the other hand, RUPA provides an irreducible
core of fiduciary duties among partners. Third, RUPA rewrites the rules
on the nature and transfer of partnership property. It adopts an entity
approach for the sake of simplicity and provides for the filing of part-
nership statements, including statements of partnership authority, disso-
ciation, and dissolution. Fourth, RUPA for the first time expressly au-
*Donald J. Weidner is Dean and a Professor and John W. Larson is an Associate Professor
at the Florida State University College of Law. Dean Weidner and Professor Larson are the
Reporters for the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. The authors wish to express their ap-
preciation to Allan Donn and Edward "Doc" Merrill for their helpful comments on a draft
of this Article. The views expressed are their own, however, and do not necessarily represent
the views of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. A copy of
the Act may be obtained from: National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
L.aws, 676 North St. Claire St., Chicago, IL 60611, (312) 915-0195.
I. The Revised Unif. Partnership Act (1993) [hereinafter RUPA) was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL or Conference)
in August 1992. The RUPA Drafting Committee thereafter proposed a number of revisions,
all of which were approved formally by the Conference at its annual meeting in August 1993.
This Article is based on the Act, as amended, which is entitled Uniform Partnership Act
(1993) by the Conference. Unless stated otherwise, all cites to RUPA are to the October 14,
1993 draft of the 1993 Act.
RUPA already has been adopted in two states. See Mont. S.B. 46 (to be codified at 1993
MONT. LAws 238); 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 17-21. Texas also adopted a revised partnership
act heavily influenced by an earlier draft of RUPA. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Laws Serv. 917
(Vernon).
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thorizes the conversion and merger of partnerships and provides "safe-
harbor" rules for those transactions.
DEFAULT AND MANDATORY RULES
Across all substantive areas, RUPA reflects the policy judgment that,
with rare exceptions, partners are permitted to govern relations among
themselves by agreement. Almost all of RUPA's rules governing the re-
lations among partners are merely default rules rather than mandatory
rules.2 That is, the statutory rules apply only in the absence of a partnership
agreement to the contrary.3 Under the present Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA), 4 it is not clear which rules are merely default rules and which rules
are mandatory rules.5 Under RUPA, every rule governing the relations
among partners is a default rule unless it is separately listed as a mandatory
rule.6
RUPA reflects an attempt to craft default rules that are efficient and
fair. The basic idea is that default rules should reflect what most partners
would regard as implicit in their partnership agreements. A default rule
that accurately reflects implicit agreements generally saves people the cost
of drafting detailed agreements and also tends to avoid unexpected results.
2. See RUPA § 103.
3. Section 103(a) provides that the partnership agreement governs relations among the
partners and between the partners and the partnership. To the extent the agreement does
not provide otherwise, RUPA governs.
4. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914) [hereinafter UPA].
5. For example, UPA § 18 is clearly a default rule. It provides rules for determining the
rights and duties of the partners, "subject to any agreement between them." It is unclear,
on the other hand, whether the UPA § 20 duty to render information on demand is mandatory
or may be varied by agreement of the partners. The incomplete and inconsistent provisions
of the UPA were noted in the thoughtful report of an American Bar Association subcommittee
appointed in 1986 to study partnerships. See UPA Revision Subcommittee on Partnerships
and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?,
43 Bus. LAw. 121, 124 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Report].
6. See RUPA § 103. Section 103(b) lists eight mandatory rules that govern the relations
among partners. It provides that the partnership agreement may not:
(1) vary the rights and duties of partners in connection with the requirements for filing
statements under the Act;
(2) "unreasonably restrict" a partner or former partner's right of access to books and
records;
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty, although the partners may identify specific types or cat-
egories of activities that do not violate the duty, if not manifestly unreasonable;
(4) "unreasonably reduce" a partner's duty of care;
(5) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, although the partners may
determine standards by which the performance of the obligation is measured, if not manifestly
unreasonable;
(6) vary the power of a partner to dissociate at any time from the partnership;
(7) vary the right of a court to expel of a partner in certain situations; or
(8) vary the requirement to wind up the business in certain situations.
But for these eight rules, partners are free to order their affairs as they see fit.
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Unpopular default rules add unnecessary cost to the extent they put people
to the expense of drafting around them. Stated differently, the short-form
contract contained in RUPA is more useful because partners are not re-
quired to incur costs to modify it. RUPA attempts to avoid burdening
partners who fail to incur the modification costs with rules to which they
would not have agreed.
Section 103(a) states the general rule that RUPA "governs the relations
among the partners and between the partners and the partnership," but
only "j[t]o the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise pro-
vide."7 Although stated somewhat indirectly, the basic principle is that the
agreement of the partners is supreme-unless the rights of third parties
are involved. Section 103(b)(9) states that the partnership agreement may
not "restrict the rights of third parties.""
THE ENTITY THEORY
The Drafting Committee began its work with no ideological or theo-
retical mandate concerning whether a partnership should be viewed as an
entity or as an aggregate. Instead, the Committee proceeded to answer a
series of pragmatic questions that arise in the formation, capitalization,
operation, and breakup of partnerships. Before the drafting was complete,
it became clear that the entity approach was adopted in virtually every
situation. That approach provides simpler rules and is consistent with RU-
PA's attempt to give partnerships greater stability.9 Accordingly, as the
project drew to a close, RUPA was amended to include a statement that
partnerships are entities.' 0
NEW RULES ON PARTNERSHIP BREAKUPS
CONFUSION CONCERNING DISSOLUTION UNDER THE
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (UPA)
At the beginning of this century, the law of partnership breakups was
couched in terms of dissolution and was quite confusing. Dean William
Draper Lewis, the Reporter who saw the UPA to completion, thought that
the concept of dissolution was perfectly logical but sadly misunderstood.
According to Lewis, "The subject of the dissolution and winding up of a
7. Id. § 103(a).
8. Id. § 103(b)(9).
9. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCrION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 36 (1987)
("Generally speaking, the entity theory of a partnership is much more functional than the
aggregate theory."). The ABA Report, supra note 5, at 124, also noted the advantages of the
entity theory. But see Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Function-
alism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395 (1989).
10. RUPA § 201. Nebraska already defines partnerships as entities: "A partnership is an
association of persons organized as a separate entity to carry on a business for profit." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 67-306(1) (1986).
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partnership is involved in considerable confusion principally because of
the various ways in which the word 'dissolution' is employed." '" His so-
lution to the confusion, which became part of the UPA, was to continue
to use the term dissolution but define in the statute both what is and what
is not dissolution. UPA section 29 states what dissolution is: "the change
in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be asso-
ciated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the
business.' 2 UPA section 30 states what dissolution is not: "[o]n dissolution
the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed." 3 All the UPA provisions on partnership
breakups then are activated by, and only by, a dissolution.' 4
Seventy-five years later, the law of partnership breakups still is confused.
Some cases found a dissolution and applied the strict logic of dissolution
even though justice seemed to require otherwise. 5 Other cases struggled
to reach a proper result by refusing to find a dissolution even though the
statute seemed to require it.16 More basically, there are cases that appear
to reflect a complete misunderstanding of the concept of dissolution as it
is used in the UPA. 17
The UPA section 29 definition of dissolution embodies the concept that
a partnership is a unique aggregation of individuals, a specific cast of
characters."' The unique cast is "dissolved" whenever a partner leaves.
Consider the simple example of a firm of four partners. Assume all the
partners, including the departing partner, happily and harmoniously agree
the departing partner will leave and the remaining partners will continue
with the business. Assume they also agree that the withdrawing partner
will neither be required to make any additional contributions nor be en-
titled to receive any additional distributions. Federal income tax law says
that the partnership continues.' 9 The UPA, on the other hand, states that
11. William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 626-27 (1915).
12. UPA §29.
13. Id. § 30.
14. See id. §§ 33-38, 40-43.
15. See, e.g., Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
16. See, e.g., Zeibak v. Nasser, 82 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1938), where the court stated that
the death of a partner does not necessarily dissolve the partnership, especially if the partner
who dies is a passive investor. The court's discussion is difficult to reconcile with UPA § 31(4),
which states that dissolution is caused "[b]y the death of any partner."
17. See, e.g., Great Hawaiian Fin. Corp. v. Aiu, 863 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1988), where
the court stated that the withdrawal of three managing partners "indicates that the original
partnership including those partners was dissolved as to those partners," but did not nec-
essarily indicate that the partnership was dissolved as to the remaining partners. See also
Cowan v. Maddin, 786 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Adams v. Jarvis, 127 N.W.2d 400
(Wis. 1964). The UPA does not support the argument that the partnership is dissolved as to
some partners but not as to others. See UPA § 30.
18. UPA § 29.
19. I.R.C. § 708 (1992).
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the "old" partnership is dissolved and a "new" partnership is created, not
withstanding the contrary intent of all of the partners.20
The UPA's dissolution logic has led many to conclude that, whenever a
partner leaves, the property of the old partnership should be conveyed to
the new partnership.2 1 It also has led to the conclusion that contracts of
the old partnership lapse because the old partnership, the party to the
contract, no longer exists, leaving only a new partnership that is a stranger
to the bargain.22 One widely-cited recent case held that a partnership could
not recover on a title insurance policy after the departure of one of its
members because the new partnership had no "standing" to assert the
contract rights of the old partnership. 23
The problem with the UPA's use of the term dissolution is therefore
much more fundamental than the absence of a clear definition of the
concept. The UPA's definition and use of the concept of dissolution is a
bad idea because it reflects an aggregate concept of partnerships that fails
to recognize the stability of many partnerships. The UPA unnecessarily
destabilizes many partnerships, particularly those that have continuation
agreements, and actually undercuts the attempts of partners to contract
for stability. The UPA suggests that the partnership business is coming to
a close when all that may be coming to a close is one partner's participation.
In short, the UPA does not distinguish adequately a departure that triggers
a winding up of the business from a departure that is governed by a buyout
or continuation agreement.
20. UPA § 29.
21. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.1 (Michie 1989), which supplements the UPA. It
provides that if the partnership is dissolved but its business is continued "without liquidation
of the partnership affairs, the title to any real estate or any interest therein vested in the
dissolved or former partnership shall be deemed to be transferred to and vested in such new
partnership as may be created by the remaining partners without further act or deed." Id.
22. See Frederick C. Smith Clinic v. Lastrapes, 170 N.E.2d 497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959),
which held that the withdrawal of a partner terminated an employment agreement that
provided it would automatically end on dissolution of the partnership. Even though the assets
of the partnership were transferred to a successor partnership that continued the business,
the successor partnership was not permitted to enforce a covenant not to compete against
an employee who resigned almost two years after the dissolution. Id. at 502. Dissenting, Judge
Younger asked rhetorically:
A contract is a two-way street. Would the defendant admit that if the partnership with
which he had contracted would have found the contract onerous it could have relieved
itself of the burden of paying him . .. by the simple process of adding or withdrawing
one member of the partnership? Can the defendant-and he alone-take from the con-
tract what he wants and leave what he doesn't?
Id. at 503 (Younger, J., dissenting).
23. Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120, 125 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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BREAKUPS UNDER RUPA PROCEED DOWN ONE OF
TWO TRACKS
The departure of a partner can result in a winding up of the partnership
business or in a buyout of the departing partner. RUPA attempts to identify
and clearly define these two tracks. It has three separate articles on part-
nership breakups that distinguish departures that cause a winding up of
the business from those which cause only a buyout of the departing part-
ner.2 4 RUPA gives stability to partnerships that have contracted for stability
by providing that, in a buyout situation, the partnership entity continues
without dissolution.
Article 6 applies to all "dissociations," whether they result in a buyout
or a winding up.25 Section 601 lists all the events that cause a partner's
dissociation, and the remaining rules in Article 6 apply to all dissociations.
Finally, Article 6 provides that Article 7 applies if a partner's dissociation
results in a buyout and that Article 8 applies if there is a dissolution and
winding up of the business.26
Article 7 applies to all dissociations that result in the buyout of a
partner. 27 Section 701(a) states that if a partner is dissociated from a
partnership without causing a dissolution and winding up, the dissociated
partner's interest must be bought out. Other provisions in Article 7 are
default rules to govern the valuation of and payout for the dissociating
partner's interest.28 Finally, Article 7 ends the ability of the departing and
continuing partners to bind each other and limits the liability of the de-
parting partner to firm creditors.29
Article 8 applies if there is a dissolution and winding up of the part-
nership business.2 0 Section 801 identifies the dissociations and other events
that cause a dissolution and winding up of the partnership business, which
means that the partnership business must be liquidated. Other provisions
in Article 8 contract the agency authority among partners and explain how
the business is to be liquidated." Finally, Article 8 provides simple default
rules to guide the settlement of accounts among partners.3 2
"DISSOCIATION" OF A PARTNER
Section 601 provides that a "partner is dissociated from a partnership"
upon any one of ten listed events. Of those ten, withdrawal, death, and
24. See generally RUPA arts. 6-8.
25. Id. § 601.
26. Id. § 603(a).
27. Id. § 701.
28. Id. § 701 (b)-(i).
29. Id. §§ 702, 703-705.
30. Id. § 801.
31. Id. §§ 802-806.
32. Id. § 807.
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expulsion are the most common. Although the term dissociation is new to
the statute, the concept is not. A partnership is formed by an "association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit;""
a "dissociation" is the beginning of the end of an association. A partner-
ship, like a marriage, often is far easier to start than it is to end. Unlike
a shareholder in a public corporation, a partner cannot simply sell his
interest and be done with the relationship. The process of dissociation is
more complicated than in the case of a corporation because every partner
has agency power and personal liability that must be wound down. Whether
there is a buyout of the dissociating partner or a liquidation of the part-
nership, the disengagement almost invariably takes time.
RUPA's list of the events that cause a dissociation answers the policy
question of whether enough has happened to trigger the contraction of
a partner's association with the business. Stated somewhat differently, to
say that a partner is dissociated is to say that the partner no longer con-
tinues as a co-owner of an on-going business.
RUPA section 601 lists all the events that cause a partner's dissociation.
RUPA section 601 parallels section 402 of the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (RULPA).3 4 That section, entitled "Events of Withdrawal,"
lists the ways one "ceases to be a general partner of a limited partner-
ship." 5 RUPA's basic terminology is different from RULPA's in two re-
spects. First, the RUPA term dissociation is broader than the RULPA term
withdrawal and more appropriately includes dissociations other than with-
drawals, such as expulsions.36 Second, RUPA rejects the RULPA language
that refers to a single moment when one "ceases" to be a partner5 7-
disengagement from the partnership relationship is a process that takes
time to accomplish.
Upon a dissociation, other provisions of RUPA implement the various
aspects of the process of disengagement from the relationship."s RUPA's
rules contract the dissociating partner's agency power, limit the disso-
ciating partner's liability for the acts of other partners, provide for the
completion of unfinished business, and pay the dissociating partner for
his or her equity in the partnership. s9 That process is described in Article
7 if it is accomplished through a buyout, and in Article 8 if it is accom-
plished through a winding up of the business.40
33. Id. § 202(a).
34. REVISED UNIV. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr (1985) [hereinafter RULPA].
35. Id. § 402.
36. RUPA § 601.
37. Id.
38. Id. arts. 7-8.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 603(a).
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WINDING UP THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS
New Meaning to the Term "Dissolution"
RUPA eliminates the UPA rule that a partnership dissolves every time
a partner leaves. 41 Under RUPA, there is no dissolution of the partnership
if a dissociating partner is bought out-dissolution only results if the busi-
ness of the partnership must be liquidated. 42 RUPA section 801 lists the
events that trigger a winding up, or liquidation, of the partnership business.
It provides that "a partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound
up, only upon" one of the listed events.
43
The term dissolution has no independent operative significance under
RUPA. Stated somewhat differently, RUPA's provisions are redundant
when they state that "a partnership is dissolved, and its business must be
wound up." 44 Section 801 simply is a list of those situations in which the
business of the partnership must begin to be wound up. The word disso-
lution is nothing more than a shorthand term for the occurrence of one
of those situations.
45
Because dissolution merely marks the beginning of the winding up pro-
cess and not the termination of the partnership, the partners subsequently
may agree to continue the partnership. Section 802(b) states that, at any
time after the dissolution of a partnership and before the winding up of
its business is completed, the remaining partners may continue the business
if the right to have the business wound up is waived by all the partners.
In that event, the partnership entity continues as if dissolution never oc-
curred, notwithstanding the temporary contraction in the scope of its
business. 4
6
RUPA's use of the term dissolution is consistent with RULPA section
801, which provides that a limited partnership "is dissolved and its affairs
shall be wound up upon the happening" of certain events. 47 It also is
consistent with modern corporation law, where a dissolution is the begin-
ning of the liquidation of the corporation. 48
41. See UPA § 29.
42. RUPA § 801.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Committee was told that there might be strong opposition to RUPA if it did not
include the word dissolution. RULPA uses the term, and the Committee was continually urged
to follow RULPA on this point.
46. Unless the partners agree otherwise, any liability incurred by the partnership after the
dissolution is determined as if dissolution never occurred. RUPA § 802(b). That validates
post-dissolution transactions that were appropriate for a continuation of the business, but
not for winding up. The rights of third parties accruing before they knew (or received a
notification) of the waiver, however, may not be affected adversely. Id.
47. RULPA § 801.
48. The MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT (1984) [hereinafter Model Act] provides that a dis-
solved corporation "continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business
except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs." Model Act
§ 14.05(a).
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Events that cause a dissolution and winding up include a partnership at
will having notice of a partner's express will 49 to withdraw, the expiration
of the term in a term partnership,50 events agreed to as resulting in liq-
uidation,5' and judicial dissolutions. 52 Most dissolution events are disso-
ciations. On the other hand, it is not necessary to have a dissociation to
cause a dissolution and winding up. The partnership simply can refrain
from taking on new business with all partners remaining active for the
sole purpose of completing unfinished business. 53
What Happens Upon Dissolution
Section 802(a) provides that a partnership continues after dissolution
"only for the purpose of winding up its business" and is terminated when
the winding up is completed. 54 Section 807(a) states what must be done
to wind up a partnership's business: "the assets of the partnership must
be applied to discharge its obligations to creditors, including partners who
are creditors. Any surplus must be applied to pay in cash the net amount
distributable to partners in accordance with their right to distribu-
tions. ... 55 RUPA thus continues the "in cash" rule of UPA section 38(1)
as opposed to in-kind distributions. The result is that a partner cannot be
forced to accept a liquidation in kind on the winding up of partnership
business.56
In-kind distributions were avoided as a default rule for several reasons.
First, they present difficult valuation problems. The partner being forced
to accept property in satisfaction of his or her claim seldom values it as
highly as those who would have him or her accept it. RUPA reflects the
conclusion that the safest way to value the assets is to sell them. 57 If the
partners can negotiate another solution, they are free to do so. Second,
the "in cash" rule is intended to give needed bargaining power to minority
partners. Finally, to the extent undivided interests in the same asset might
49. RUPA § 801(1). The "express will" concept is continued from UPA §§ 31(1)(b)-(c) &
31(2) (causes of dissolution).
50. RUPA § 801(2).
51. Id. § 801(3).
52. Id. § 801(5), (6).
53. Section 801 provides that a term partnership "is dissolved, and its business must be
wound up" upon "the express will of all of the partners." Id. § 801(2)(ii). See also id. § 801(3)
(dissolution upon "an event agreed to in the partnership agreement resulting in the winding
up of the partnership business").
54. Id. § 802(a).
55. id. § 807(a).
56. See Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979), which stated that
a "sale is the best means of determining the true fair market value of the assets.... While
judicial sales in some instances may cause economic hardships, these hardships can be avoided
by the use of partnership agreements." Id. at 339. But see Rinke v. Rinke, 48 N.W.2d 201
(Mich. 1951).
57. RUPA § 807.
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be involved in an in-kind distribution, it does not make sense to force
people trying to disengage as partners into another form of concurrent
ownership they might find all too familiar.
Although RUPA requires that the business be sold whenever there is an
event of dissolution,58 it also attempts to avoid compelling a precipitous
sale. Section 803(c) authorizes the partners who are winding up the busi-
ness to "preserve the partnership business or property as a going concern
for a reasonable time. "
59
Neither the UPA nor the case law gives partners any clear concept of
how they are to settle accounts among themselves as they liquidate. There
is remarkably little case law on point, and even recent cases are hopelessly
confused.60 RUPA section 807(b) contains a simple statement to guide the
settlement of partnership accounts:
In settling accounts among the partners, the profits and losses that
result from the liquidation of the partnership assets must be credited
and charged to the partners' accounts. The partnership shall make a
distribution to a partner in an amount equal to any excess of the
credits over the charges in the partner's account. A partner shall
contribute to the partnership an amount equal to any excess of the
charges over the credits in the partner's account. 6'
With this statement and related language, RUPA brings the statutory law
of partnerships into conformity with modern accounting concepts. 62 In
particular, it directly states the current default rule that a negative capital
account is a debt to the partnership. 63
BUYOUT OF DISSOCIATED PARTNER'S INTEREST
Little Guidance Under the UPA
The UPA says little about the buyout of a partner. UPA section 38(2)
provides that, if there is a wrongful dissolution, the partners who have not
dissolved wrongfully may continue the business "during the agreed term"
if they unanimously agree to do so. 64 To do so, they must "secure the
58. d. § 803.
59. Id. § 803(c). See Paciaroni v. Crane, 408 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. Ch. 1979).
60. See, e.g., Hamilton Airport Advertising v. Hamilton, 462 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
61. RUPA § 807(b).
62. Under RUPA § 401 (a), each partner is deemed to have an account that is (i) credited
with the partner's contributions to the partnership and his or her share of the profits, and
(ii) charged with the partner's share of the losses and any distributions to the partner. RUPA
§ 807(b) instructs how to close out the accounts after dissolution. Accountants and tax lawyers
call them "capital accounts." The partnership, however, may adopt a different accounting
system if it chooses. RUPA § 103.
63. Id. § 807(b).
64. UPA § 38(2).
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payment by bond approved by the court, or pay to any partner who has
caused the dissolution wrongfully, the value of his interest in the part-
nership at the dissolution, less any damages recoverable ... and in like
manner indemnify him against all present or future partnership liabili-
ties." 65 There is no further definition of the buyout in the statute and the
case law leaves many uncertainties about how the UPA rules apply.
RUPA Provides Clear Default Rules
RUPA has an extensive and clear statement of a core set of buyout rules
that apply to both wrongful and non-wrongful dissociations. Section 701 (a)
provides that, if a partner's dissociation does not result in a dissolution
and winding up under Article 8, "the partnership shall cause the disso-
ciated partner's interest in the partnership to be purchased for a buyout
price" determined pursuant to the Act. 66 RUPA thus declares that the
partnership is obligated to buy out the dissociating partner.
A major qualification to the mandatory buyout is that a partner who
wrongfully dissociates before the completion of an agreed term or un-
dertaking has no right to immediate payment for his or her interest.67
Section 701(h) provides that such a partner "is not entitled to payment
of any portion of the buyout price until the expiration of the term or
completion of the undertaking, unless the partner establishes to the sat-
isfaction of the court that the earlier payment will not cause undue hard-
ship to the business of the partnership. ' 68 That rule is designed to protect
the non-breaching partners from an unexpected loss of capital.
Section 701(b) is the default rule to determine the buyout price:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that
would have been distributable to the dissociating partner under Sec-
tion 807(b) if, on the date of the dissociation, the assets of the part-
nership were sold at a price equal to the greater of the liquidation
value or the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going
concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership were
wound up as of that date. Interest must be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.69
The basic policy judgment is that the departing partner should get the
same amount through the buyout that he or she would get if the business
were wound up. Theoretically, the amount paid to the dissociating partner
should be the same whether there is a buyout by the continuing partnership
65. Id. § 38(2)(b). In "ascertaining the value of the partner's interest the value of the
good-will of the business shall not be considered." Id. § 38(2)(c)II. See also id. § 42.
66. RUPA § 701(a).
67. Id. § 701 (h).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 701(b).
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or a liquidation of the business. As a consequence, there is no minority
discount.
Valuing the assets at "the greater of liquidation value or value based on
sale of the entire business as a going concern without the dissociating
partner"70 serves two purposes. First, it cuts through some of the confusion
in the cases concerning the term going concern value. To many, going concern
value is a term used to explain that assets that are part of a going concern
have greater value than the sum of the values of the individual assets.7
On the other hand, recent partnership cases in the estate tax context state
that going concern value is lower than liquidation value if the assets cannot
be liquidated because they are committed to a going concern. 72 In effect,
dedication to a going concern is considered an encumbrance. Section 701
is intended to indicate that, however value is perceived, the higher of the
two values is to be used. Second, valuation of the going concern "without
the dissociating partner" is intended to emphasize that the partner being
bought out need not be paid for his or her human capital. 73
In computing the buyout price, the amount the dissociating partner
receives is reduced by his or her share of partnership liabilities.74 Accord-
ingly, it is important that the dissociating partner not be called upon to
satisfy liabilities that already reduced the amount he or she received. To
avoid this double liability, section 701(d) provides:
A partnership shall indemnify a dissociated partner against all part-
nership liabilities incurred before the dissociation, except liabilities
then unknown to the partnership, and against all partnership liabilities
incurred after the dissociation .... [A] liability not known to a partner
other than the dissociated partner is not known to the partnership. 75
This provision improves the UPA rule in two respects. First, unlike the
UPA, it is not internally inconsistent. 76 Second, it articulates a concept
behind the liabilities that are the object of indemnification. RUPA's default
rule on indemnification reflects the solution partners would likely nego-
tiate, namely, an indemnification against all liabilities that are taken into
70. Id.
71. "Going-concern value is, in essence, the additional element of value which attaches
to property by reason of its existence as an integral part of a going concern." VGS Corp.
v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 563, 591 (1977), acq., 1979-2 C.B. 2. United States v. Cornish,
348 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'g and remanding 221 F. Supp. 658 (D. Or. 1963), is the
classic case attempting to identify and value the assets "behind" the purchase of a partnership
interest. Cornish stated that the cost new partners paid for going concern value was incurred
for "a true nondepreciable intangible asset of the partnership." Id. at 185.
72. See Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483 (11 th Cir. 1987), aff'g 51 T.C.M.
(CCH) 60 (1985).
73. RUPA § 701.
74. See id. §§ 701(b), 807(a).
75. Id. § 701 (d).
76. Compare UPA § 38(2)(b) with id. § 38(2)(c)II.
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account in computing the buyout price, which would not include liabilities
that are completely unanticipated or that are known only to the dissociating
partner.
If negotiations break down, RUPA requires the partnership to pay the
estimated amount due to the departing partner, pending final determi-
nation of the buyout price. 77 Section 701(e) provides: "If no agreement
for the purchase of a dissociated partner's interest is reached within 120
days after a written demand for payment, the partnership shall pay ... in
cash to the dissociated partner the amount the partnership estimates to
be the buyout price and accrued interest. s7 8 The payment (or offer to pay)
must be accompanied by supporting financial statements and by "written
notice that the payment is in full satisfaction of the obligation to purchase
unless, within 120 days after the written notice, the dissociated partner
commences an action to determine the buyout price. ' 79 Those provisions,
unprecedented in the UPA, are based on dissenters' rights provisions in
corporate statutes.80
WINDING DOWN OTHER ASPECTS OF THE
RELATIONSHIP
The UPA Approach
Whether there is a buyout or a liquidation, the agency power and liability
among partners must be wound down, unfinished business must be com-
pleted, and liabilities must be apportioned. The UPA addresses those issues
with a single set of provisions that apply whether there is a buyout or a
liquidation."' Because any departure triggers a dissolution under the UPA,
its provisions are triggered by, and only by, a dissolution.
Many people fail to understand that partners remain partners even after
one says "I quit" or "You're out!" The logic of the UPA is clear, but its
significance continues to be elusive. Under UPA section 29, a dissolution
is merely a "change in the relation" of the partners, not an end to the
relationship. UPA section 30 attempts to clarify that the relationship con-
tinues, but with a contraction in scope, by providing that the partnership
"continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed. '8 2
On dissolution, therefore, little happens to the partnership relationship
except that the scope of the partnership business narrows, perhaps only
77. See RUPA § 701(e).
78. Id. If deferred payment is permitted because the dissociating partner prematurely
withdrew, the partnership may make an offer to pay rather than a present payment. Id.
§ 701 (f).
79. Id. § 701(g)(4).
80. See Model Act § 13.25(b).
81. UPA §§ 29-43.
82. Id. § 30. Winding up is not complete simply because the partners declare it completed;
winding up is not complete until partnership obligations are satisfied. See Sitchenko v. DiResta,
512 F. Supp. 758, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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slightly. 3 Under the UPA, the continuing exposure to unlimited personal
liability is open-ended. UPA section 36(1) provides that dissolution "does
not of itself discharge the existing liability of any partner." 4 UPA section
35(1)(a) adds that, after dissolution, partners can bind each other "by any
act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing trans-
actions unfinished at dissolution.18 5 Indeed, they can bind the partnership
"by any transaction which would bind the partnership if dissolution had
not taken place," if the other party has no notice of the dissolution.
6
RUPA Has Separate Rules for Buyouts and Dissolutions
Under RUPA, the rules for disengaging from the partnership differ
depending on whether there is a buyout of a dissociating partner or a
dissolution and winding up of the business. In both situations, a partner's
lingering agency power can be cut off more quickly and easily than under
the UPA.
Winding Down If There Is a Buyout
If there is a buyout, the scope of the partnership business continues
unaltered for those partners who remain with the partnership.8 7 Their
agency power and personal liability for both old and new liabilities is
unaffected by another partner's dissociation and buyout.88 Nor is the dis-
sociating partner automatically discharged from partnership obligations
incurred before the dissociation.89 On the other hand, the management
rights of a partner who is being bought out end immediately upon his or
83. See Levy v. Disharoon, 749 P.2d 84 (N.M. 1988), involving a partnership formed to
purchase and operate an airplane. Relying on UPA § 35(1)(a), the court held that a partner
was liable for the operation of the airplane even after giving written notice of his intent to
"terminate" his relationship. Id. at 88. Liability extends through the winding-up period,
which in this case required steps to preserve partnership assets: "A liquidating partner can
act on behalf of his former associates in matters in which they still have a common interest
and are under a common liability. Sometimes the period between dissolution and termination
requires that the partnership business be conducted for the preservation of its assets." Id.
(citations omitted).
84. UPA § 36(1).
85. Id. § 35(1)(a). In Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), the court
held a partner liable for an oversight that took place four years after he left the law firm.
The obligation to the client was undertaken by the firm while he still was a member. Id. at
46.
86. UPA § 35(l)(b). The strongest notice requirement is for those who extended credit
to the partnership prior to dissolution. Id. § 35(1)(b)I. With respect to those who previously
had not extended credit, but nevertheless knew of the partnership before dissolution, part-
ners' apparent authority may be cut off by published notice of the dissolution. Id. § 35(1 )(b)II.
87. There may be some alteration in scope if a significant amount of the firm capital is
used to buy out the departing member.
88. RUPA § 702.
89. Id. § 703(a).
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her dissociation.9" So, too, does the partner's duty to refrain from com-
peting with the partnership, although he or she has some continuing duty
of loyalty and care with respect to matters arising before the dissociation. 9'
RUPA makes several changes to the rules that govern the winding down
of the departing partner's lingering agency power and personal liability
for post-dissociation obligations. First, RUPA minimizes the partnership's
risk of being bound by the departing partner's lingering agency authority,
and the departing partner's risk of liability for a new partnership debt, by
imposing a reliance requirement on third parties. 92 In both cases, liability
is limited to those who, at the time of entering into a transaction, "rea-
sonably believed that the dissociated partner was then a partner ... [and]
did not have notice of the partner's dissociation." 9
Second, and more importantly, third parties are deemed conclusively to
have notice of a partner's dissociation ninety days after the filing of a
statement of dissociation. 94 Thus, there is a strong incentive for both the
partnership and a departing partner to make sure a statement is filed
immediately after the partner's dissociation. Creditors also can be expected
to consult the record more frequently when dealing with a partner.
Finally, RUPA limits a dissociating partner's agency power and personal
liability to a maximum period of two years following dissociation, regardless
of a third party's notice or reliance, even if no statement of dissociation
is filed.95 The policy judgment is that the continuing exposure of partners
under the UPA is far too open-ended, particularly in an era of easy access
to limited liability organizations.
Winding Down If There Is a Liquidation
In the case of a dissolution and winding up, the scope of the partnership
business narrows with respect to all partners. All partners have a right to
participate in management during the liquidation, except a partner who
wrongfully caused the liquidation. 96 All partners are bound by acts ap-
propriate to the winding up.97 In addition, partners are bound by acts
that, before dissolution, would have bound the partnership, if the third
party had no notice of the dissolution.98 Third parties, however, are
90. Id. § 603(b)(1).
91. Id. § 603(b)(3).
92. See id. § 702(a) (dissociated partner's power to bind the partnership), 703(b) (dis-
sociated partner's liability to third parties).
93. d. § 702(a)(1), (2).
94. Id. § 704(c).
95. Id. §§ 702(a) (agency power), 703(b) (personal liability).
96. Id. § 803(a).
97. Id. § 804(1).
98. Id. § 804(2). As among the partners, a partner who knowingly incurs a partnership
liability that is not appropriate for winding up is liable to the partnership for any damage
caused to the partnership arising from the liability. Id. § 806(b).
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deemed conclusively to have notice of the dissolution ninety days after the
filing of a statement of dissolution.99 That is analogous to the rule provided
in the case of a buyout'00 and adds considerably to the protection of
partners from liability for inappropriate acts following dissolution.
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
THE STATE OF THE LAW UNDER THE UPA
Traditional legal analysis of fiduciary duties distinguishes the duty of
care from the duty of loyalty. That is true in the general law of principal
and agent'0 1 and in the law of corporations.1 0 2 The UPA has no duty of
care provision. Nor does the term duty of loyalty even appear in the UPA.
The UPA does, however, contain a number of provisions that can be in-
terpreted as a broad duty of loyalty.
03
UPA section 21, entitled "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary," is the
core provision generally cited as the statutory authority for a duty of loyalty
among partners. It states:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and
hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent
of the other partners from any transaction connected with the for-
mation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use
by him of its property.'
0 4
Although a basic purpose of this language is to give excluded partners
priority over the separate creditors of a disloyal partner as to traceable
usurped assets, "o5 it has been treated by courts as the statutory foundation
for broad and powerful fiduciary duties among partners, particularly duties
of loyalty."'06
Other provisions of the UPA provide more specific rights and obligations
that are often thought of as part of the duty of loyalty. Access to infor-
mation is provided in UPA section 19, which states that "every partner
shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy" partnership
books.' 7 More broadly, UPA section 20 provides that "partners shall ren-
der on demand true and full information of all things affecting the part-
99. Id. § 805(d).
100. See supra text accompanying note 94.
101. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958) ("Duty of Care and Skill")
with id. § 387 ("General Principle").
102. The Model Act distinguishes the duty of care from the duty of loyalty by providing
separate sections for each. See Model Act §§ 8.30(a)(2) (duty of care), 8.61 (duty of loyalty).
103. See generally UPA §§ 18-21.
104. Id. § 21(1).
105. See id. § 21(1) Official Comment.
1(16. See Lipinski v. Lipinski, 35 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Minn. 1949).
107. UPA § 19.
RUPA: The Reporters' Overview 17
nership to any partner." 0 8 The UPA section 18 rule of equal management
rights has led some commentators to conclude that partners owe each
other a duty to consult. 09
Despite the statutory rules, it is case law that has reigned supreme in
the area of fiduciary duties among partners. Criticism of the case law falls
into two camps. One states that the language of the cases sets an unreal-
istically high standard of behavior among partners. In particular, this camp
asserts that activist courts are prone to upset the terms of negotiated
agreements by requiring partners to be selfless. Stated differently, some
fear that written partnership agreements will be set aside, under the rubric
of fiduciary obligation, whenever a judge thinks the provisions are unfair.
The second, related camp, states that the rhetoric of the "fiduciary" opin-
ions overstates what the courts are doing. This camp asserts that, upon
close examination, it is clear that courts recognize many situations where
a partner legitimately may pursue self-interest. 0
Those in the first camp make a two-pronged assault. First, they assert
that it is not appropriate to refer to partners as fiduciaries. They state that
a partner is not a fiduciary in the same strict sense as a trustee."' They
explain that a trustee is a person who acts solely on behalf of a beneficiary,
whereas a partner by definition is a co-proprietor, a co-owner acting on
his or her own behalf. Second, the more extreme members of this camp
state that the basic notion of freedom of contract should enable partners
in negotiated transactions to draft away all aspects of fiduciary obligation.
108. Id. § 20. The "on demand" language of this section is tempered by the fact that a
duty to consult has been found in UPA § 18(e), which provides that "[a]ll partners have equal
rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business." See Robert W. Hillman,
Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look At Participatory Rights in The Management of General
Partnerships, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 865, which provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in the U.P.A. gives partners with sufficient power to control a venture a license
to ignore consistently the views of minority participants about matters within the ordinary
course of business. The principal importance of section 18(e) lies in its recognition and
enforcement of dignity interests, and the basis it provides for a participant to resist
unwanted exile from partnership affairs.
Id. at 887 (emphasis in original); see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP 42 (1987). UPA § 20 arguably limits the thrust of the UPA § 18(e) infor-
mation right by suggesting that it be honored "on demand" rather than volunteered as
appropriate. RUPA § 403(c) retains the UPA's "on demand" language.
109. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 108, at 42 (citing Hillman, supra note 108, at 883-
87).
110. See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
425 (1987).
111. See Model Act § 8.30 Official Comment:
Section 8.30 does not use the term "fiduciary" in the standard for directors' conduct,
because that term could be confused with the unique attributes and obligations of a
fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts, some of which are not appropriate for directors
of a corporation.
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Stated differently, they argue that fiduciary duties should be merely default
rules and not mandatory rules.
RUPA SECTION 404
Partners as Limited Fiduciaries
Section 404 t12 is a compromise on an extraordinarily controversial topic.
No amount of debate ever will close the gap between those who want
powerful and immutable fiduciary duties' 3 and those who want them con-
fined statutorily and reduced to default rules.'1 4 Section 404 is a compro-
mise that, on the one hand, continues the use of the term fiduciary and
the language of duty of loyalty and, on the other hand, confines their
application.
Section 404(a) states that the "only fiduciary duties a partner owes to
the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty
112. SECTION 404. GENERAL STANDARDS OF PARTNER'S CONDUCT.
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the
following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit
derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived
from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a part-
nership opportunity, without the consent of the other partners;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the
partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership
without the consent of the other partners; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership
business before the dissolution of the partnership without the consent of the other partners.
(c) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and
winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
(d) A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners under
this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
(e) A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest.
(f) A partner may lend money to and transact other business with the partnership. The
rights and obligations of a partner who lends money to or transacts business with the part-
nership are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable
law.
(g) This section applies to a person winding up the partnership business as the personal
or legal representative of the last surviving partner as if the person were a partner.
113. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary
Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 111 (1993); Allan W.
Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U.
L. REV. 522 (forthcoming 1993).
114. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform Part-
nerhhiip Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 11, 138 (1990).
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of care," as set forth in subsections (b) and (c)." 5 Section 404 then states
that partners are not subject to the same fiduciary duties as disinterested
trustees, defines the duties of loyalty and care, and provides that partners
are subject to an overall "obligation" of good faith and fair dealing. 116
Partners Are Not Disinterested Trustees
RUPA continues to use the term fiduciary to preserve the great bulk of
the case law describing partners as fiduciaries. Partners and other co-
owners" 7 have been long held to be fiduciaries." 8 Indeed, the law of
partnership reflects the broader law of principal and agent, which states
that every agent is a fiduciary." 9 Section 301 (1) continues the rule of UPA
section 9 that every partner is a general agent of the partnership. More-
over, section 104(a) provides that the principles of law and equity sup-
plement the Act "unless displaced by particular provisions."' 12 0
115. RUPA § 404(a).
116. Id. § 404(b), (c).
117. See, e.g., 2 Russell D. Niles & William F. Walsh, Concurrent Estates and Their Charac-
teristics, in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.16, at 69 (1952): "Historically, cotenants have
been regarded in equity as fiduciaries of one another where they have acquired their interests
at the same time, either by inheritance from a common ancestor or by the same deed or
will."
118. Although Chief judge Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y.
1928), probably is considered the classic statement of the fiduciary duties of partners, there
is much earlier authority to the same effect. See Salhinger v. Salhinger, 105 P. 236 (Wash.
1909): "There is no stronger fiduciary relation known to the law than that of a copartnership,
where one man's property and property rights are subject to a large extent to the control
and administration of another." Id. at 237; see also Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 543
(1893).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958): "Agency is the fiduciary relation
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."
120. RUPA § 104(a). This continues the rule of UPA section 4(3) which applies the law
of principal and agent to partnerships. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a
(1958) states: "The rights and liabilities of partners with respect to each other ... are largely
determined by agency principles."
In Waite v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619 (N.H. 1989), the court stated that reasonable minds
can disagree on when to impose fiduciary duties:
The rule generally accepted ... imposes a fiduciary duty not only with respect to trans-
actions occurring during the partnership but also with respect to "those taking place
during the negotiations leading to the formation of the partnership." This rule reflects
the assumption that during negotiations to form a partnership, the parties are not dealing
with one another at arm's length, but rather are attempting to structure a common
enterprise, one which must be based on trust and loyalty. An equally valid assumption,
that parties negotiating to form a partnership deal at arm's length in a struggle for
competitive advantage, gives rise to the alternative rule imposing no fiduciary duty until
the actual formation of a partnership.
Id. at 625 (citations omitted).
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On the other hand, RUPA deletes the traditional agency rule that would
require abnegation of self: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject
to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in
all matters connected with his agency."1 21 RUPA rejects that agency rule
in section 404(e), by providing that neither the fiduciary duty of loyalty
nor the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is violated "merely because
the partner's conduct furthers that partner's own interest.' ' 22 This state-
ment is designed to recognize and protect the legitimate pursuit of self-
interest among partners. It reflects the current case law that permits part-
ners to bargain among themselves and to agree that certain benefits will
not be shared.
23
Section 404(f) is a more narrow expression of the general rule that a
partner may pursue self-interest. It states: "The rights and obligations of
a partner who lends money to or transacts business with the partnership
are the same as those of a person who is not a partner."'' 24 That rule
codifies the case law holding that dual-capacity transactions do not nec-
essarily violate the duty of loyalty.' 2 5 In particular, the goal is to confirm
that a person may be both a partner and a lender. Wearing the hat of
lender, lender remedies may be pursued.
2 6
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
122. RUPA § 404(e). Section 4.04(f) of the new Texas partnership act provides explicitly:
"Trstee Standard Inapplicable. A partner, in that capacity, is not a trustee and is not held to
the same standards as a trustee." 1993 Tex. Sess. Laws Serv. 917, § 4.04(f) (Vernon).
123. There is a certain tension between authorizing the pursuit of self-interest and con-
tinuing to use the term fiduciary. Case law continues to state that the partner as fiduciary is
to bc selfless. For example, the New York Court of Appeals recently stated:
[l]t is elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those
whose interests the fiduciary is to protect. This is a sensitive and "inflexible" rule of
fidelity. ... requiring avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary's personal interest
possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty. ... [A] fiduciary ...
is bound to single mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed.
Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (emphasis added) (citations
onitted).
On the other hand, commentators such as Professor Hillman emphasize that the courts
cannot possibly mean the logical consequences of their broad statements. See Hillman, supra
note 110, at 457.
124. RUPA § 404(f).
125. See, e.g., Westminister Properties, Inc. v. Atlanta Assocs., 301 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. 1983).
126. In Westminster Properties 301 S.E.2d 636, prior to Georgia's adoption of the UPA,
the court rejected the argument that a partner's duties prevented him or her from exercising
rights as a secured creditor.
On the other hand, a partner cannot wrongfully cause a default merely to activate his or
her nonpartner rights. See Natpar Corp. v. E.T. Kassinger, Inc., 365 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988),
in which the court granted an interlocutory injunction prohibiting a partner named Natpar
fronm foreclosing on certain property mortgaged to Natpar by its own partnership:
The essence of [the] complaint is that Natpar has wrongly brought about the default of
the partnership to Natpar by failing to comply with its obligation under the partnership
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DUTY OF CARE
Mixed Statement in the Present Law
As previously discussed, agency law and partnership law are inter-
woven.127 The Restatement position is that a paid agent owes a duty to the
principal to act with "standard care" and skill.' 28 The leading hornbook
on partnerships, on the other hand, states that partners "are not subject
to the ordinary care standard applicable to a paid agent.' 1 29 Yet there are
both old and new statements that partners are subject to an ordinary care
standard.
Writing in 1841, Mr. Justice Story opined that "good faith, reasonable
skill and diligence, and the exercise of sound judgment and discretion,
are naturally, if not necessarily, implied from the very nature and character
of the relation of partnership."'130 He traced the principle to Roman law,
which he summarized as follows: "In cases of partnership the same dili-
gence is ordinarily required of each partner, as reasonable and prudent
men generally employ about the like business; unless the circumstances of
the particular case repel such a conclusion."' 3' Much more recently, the
Supreme Court of Maine stated that partners are subject to an "ordinarily
prudent person" standard. 32
RUPA Section 404(c): A Gross Negligence Standard
Section 404(c) provides that a "partner's duty of care to the partnership
and the other partners . . . is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing vio-
agreement to pay its share of operating expenses. Obviously, although the partnership
granted Natpar a security deed, the partnership did not grant Natpar the right to refuse
to pay its obligation to the partnership. We find that equitable relief is appropriate...
and is not inconsistent with our decision in Westminster Properties, in which it was un-
disputed that Westminster took no wrongful action which precipitated the default to it.
Id. at 444-45.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 119-120.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958):
Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with
standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work
which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he
has.
129. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 6, at 6:85 (1988).
130. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 261 (1841).
131. Id. at 263.
132. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988). See also Roper v. Thomas, 298
S.E.2d 424, 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), in which the court said it was meritless to argue that
a general partner "may be personally liable for gross neglect of his duties, mismanagement,
fraud and deceit resulting in loss to a third person, but not for error of judgment made in
good faith."
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lation of law."' 33 At first glance, it might sound preposterous to reject the
conclusion that partners owe each other the duty to use reasonable care.
On the other hand, the question is how partners allocate risk of loss among
themselves. As among all the partners, should a partner bear all the losses
caused by his or her own negligence? Or is a loss caused by a partner's
negligence to be allocated among the partners according to the same rules
that allocate losses caused by the negligence of a non-partner?
It is clear that partners may agree to share losses in any way they like
and that the task is to identify the appropriate default rule. The general
default rule under RUPA is that partners share partnership losses, whether
capital or operating, in accordance with their share of the profits. 3 4 The
issue, therefore, is whether there should be a separate default rule for
losses caused by the negligence of a partner.
The share in profits generally considered the sine qua non of partner
status suggests that the interests of partnership and partner tend to con-
verge. That may be easiest to see if there are few partners and each has
an equal share. Perhaps more importantly, the exposure of partners to
unlimited personal liability to all contract and tort creditors provides a
powerful incentive to exercise due care.3 5 It also provides incentive to
monitor the behavior of other partners. It therefore does not appear
necessary to allocate the risk of loss inside the partnership in order to
encourage either good performance or good monitoring.
To the extent partners know that they vary in ability or attitude toward
care, they are likely to contract. Their contracting may take a form other
than an altered loss-sharing ratio. Rather, they may assign low-risk func-
tions to high-risk partners. On the other hand, contracting for a reasonable
care standard may be far less likely when partners assume they are equally
skillful and careful.
If partners believe that losses due to negligence are an inevitable series
of costs that over time will be imposed randomly and equally on all part-
ners, a contract to share those losses seems likely. In that situation, an
agreement to share losses primarily affects the timing of a partner's loss,
not the amount of his or her loss. An agreement to share losses due to a
partner's negligence in effect allows each partner to amortize the losses
he or she incurs. The loss-sharing agreement thus avoids a material dis-
tortion of income at the level of the individual partner.
An assumption of equality, therefore, is what supports RUPA's default
rule that partners tacitly agree to share the losses caused by each other's
133. RUPA § 404(c).
134. Id. § 401(b). Capital and operating losses are treated the same. Profits are shared
equally by the partners under RUPA § 401(b). These are merely default rules. RUPA § 103.
135. At least one article contends that such an explanation is insufficient to sustain a
theory that partners should not be held to an ordinary care standard. See Norwood P. Bev-
eridge, Duty of Care: The Partnership Cases, 15 OKLA. Crr' U. L. REV. 753, 765 (1990).
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ordinary negligence.13 6 If equality is assumed, it is likely that the partners
as a group will agree either to self-insure or to purchase third-party in-
surance. Thus, there should not be a default rule that specially allocates
the losses caused by the negligence of a partner. Unless the partnership
agreement provides otherwise, the losses are shared equally.
DUTY OF LOYALTY
RUPA section 404(b) purports to be an exclusive statement of the duty
of loyalty of partners. It provides that every partner has a duty of loyalty
to the partnership and the other partners that is limited to three specific
rules. Those rules may be abrogated by agreement only to a point which
is not "manifestly unreasonable."1 37
The specific and exclusive nature of the section was motivated in part
by a sense that vague, broad statements of a duty of loyalty cause too much
uncertainty. It was suggested that overly broad judicial language has left
practitioners uncertain about whether their negotiated agreements will be
voided. It was said that lawyers and their clients want to be able to negotiate
transactions, reduce their agreements to writing, and have some comfort
that those agreements will not be undone by "fuzzy" notions of fiduciary
duties. The first specific rule imposes a duty
to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding
up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner
of partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity, without the consent of other partners. 38
This provision is drawn virtually unchanged from UPA section 21 (1), which
suggests that it will continue to be viewed as the statutory foundation of
a broad and powerful duty of loyalty.
The other two rules comprising RUPA's duty of loyalty are new to the
partnership act. The first provides that each partner has a duty "to refrain
from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the
partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse
to the partnership without the consent of the other partners.' 3 9 The
second provides that each partner has a duty "to refrain from competing
with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before
the dissolution of the partnership without the consent of the other part-
ners." 40 Neither of these rules, however, is new to the law.' 4'
136. RUPA § 404(b).
137. See id. § 103(b)(3).
138. Id. § 404(b)(1).
139. Id. § 404(b)(2).
140. Id. § 404(b)(3).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389, 393 (1958).
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THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
RUPA provides that each partner "shall discharge the duties to the
partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the part-
nership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing."' 42 This obligation may not be varied by
agreement, except that the partners may "determine the standards by
which the performance is to be measured, if the standards are not man-
ifestly unreasonable."' 43
The "good faith" requirement draws upon both the fiduciary law of
cooperative relationships and the contract law of adversarial relationships.
Partnership loyalty cases are replete with statements that partners owe
each other the duty to act "in good faith" or some variant, such as "utmost
good faith."' 44 Indeed, in an earlier draft of RUPA, good faith and fair
dealing was referred to as a "duty" rather than as an "obligation" and
was the only mandatory fiduciary duty.145
On the other hand, the duty of good faith and fair dealing has roots in
the contract law that governs purely adversarial relationships. In the con-
tract context, the requirement of good faith has been described as an
"excluder" rule, one that is defined by what it excludes rather than by
142. RUPA § 404(d). Cf THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.01 (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992):
§ 5.01. Duty of Fair Dealing of Directors, Senior Executives, and Controlling Share-
holders
Directors [§ 1.13], senior executives [§ 1.33], and controlling shareholders [§ 1.10],
when interested [§ 1.23] in a matter affecting the corporation, are under a duty of fair
dealing, which duty may be fulfilled as set forth in Chapters 2 and 3 of Part V. This duty
includes the obligation to make appropriate disclosure as provided in such Chapters.
143. RUPA § 103(b)(5). That language is drawn from U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1989), which
provides that the obligation of good faith "may not be disclaimed by agreement but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance ... is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
Academic commentary suggests that the manifestly unreasonable standard "invites judicial
scrutiny of contract terms without ... regard to the bargaining process by which those terms
were reached." J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments on the
Latest Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727, 757 (1991). It is further suggested that
this standard imbues courts with the power to act as "roving commissions" to search out
injustice in partnership agreements. Id.
144. See, e.g., Levy v. Disharoon, 749 P.2d 84, 89 (N.M. 1988); Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (dictum); Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal.
1961).
145. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (Draft, Aug. 2, 1991).
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what it includes.1 46 The general definition of good faith in the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is simply "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."1 47 The U.C.C. is more exacting in the case of a
merchant, for whom good faith means "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. ' 1 48 Be-
cause RUPA assumes cooperative rather than adversarial relationships, the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing presumably will be given a more
powerful reading in the partnership context.1
49
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF INFORMATION AND
CONSULTATION RIGHTS
The section 404 assertion that it contains an exclusive list of the fiduciary
duties of partners is subject to one major qualification: the information
and consultation rights of partners remain, as they were under the UPA ,50
separately stated. RUPA includes obligations that have been considered
fiduciary in nature without describing them as fiduciary duties. For ex-
146. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 VA. L. REv. 195, 262 (1968).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also recognizes a duty of good faith and fair dealing:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its per-
formance and its enforcement." The comment states that the meaning of good faith varies
with the context:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith"
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COrTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
147. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990).
148. Id. § 2-103(l)(b). That definition of good faith applies for purposes of Article 2
"unless the context otherwise requires." Id.
149. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (the court stated that the power to dissolve
a partnership at will is confined by the duty of good faith, which it seemed to equate with
a powerful duty of loyalty). Page is criticized in ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS
81-84 (1990).
The duty of loyalty is discussed as part of the duty of good faith in Levy v. Disharoon,
749 P.2d 84 (N.M. 1988):
In a partnership relationship, each partner has the right to have his co-partner exercise
good faith in all partnership matters. It follows from the general requirement of good
faith in partnership dealings that a partner is not allowed to gain any advantage over a
co-partner by fraud, misrepresentation or concealment, and for any advantage so ob-
tained he must account to the co-partner.
Id. at 89 (citations omitted). See generally Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505
(Mass. 1975) (the court emphasized that partners owe each other the "utmost good faith
and loyalty," referring repeatedly to it as a "strict good faith standard," and holding the
shareholders of a close corporation to a similar standard).
150. See UPA §§ 19 (right of access to books), 20 (duty to render information on demand).
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ample, section 403(b) states: "A partnership shall provide partners and
their agents and attorneys access to its books and records."1 5' That right
is not conditioned on the partner's purpose or motive.152 Former partners
also are given information rights, but limited "to the period during which
they were partners."'
53
Beyond access to the partnership's books and records, each partner and
the partnership also is required to furnish, on demand, "to the extent just
and reasonable, complete and accurate information concerning the part-
nership."' 54 Absent such a demand, an affirmative disclosure duty may
arise under some circumstances. For example, it has been suggested that
the equal right of all partners under the UPA to participate in
management'5 5 gives rise to an interstitial duty to provide partners with
material information.156 RUPA provides an identical management right and
thus presumably provides identical information rights.
57
THE IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
RUPA takes the position that there is an irreducible core of fiduciary
duties that cannot be drafted away. As one Drafting Committee member
put it, "Fiduciary duty is the glue that holds the partnership together."'' 58
Although the case law rarely states that fiduciary duties are mandatory,
RUPA echoes the recent United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit opinion in Wartski v. Bedford. 159 The court stated that "[t]he fi-
duciary duty of partners is an integral part of the partnership agreement
whether or not expressly set forth therein. It cannot be negated by the
words of the partnership agreement."'
60
RUPA states that four fiduciary and information rules cannot be negated
by the partnership agreement.' 6' First, the agreement may not "unrea-
sonably restrict the right of access to books and records.' 2 Second, the
agreement may not "eliminate the duty of loyalty,"' 63 "but the partners
by agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do
151. RUPA § 403(b).
152. See id. § 403 cmt. 2; cf Model Act § 16.02(c)(1) (shareholder access to certain cor-
porate books and records conditioned on proper purpose).
153. See RUPA § 403(b).
154. See id. § 403(c).
155. UPA § 18(e).
156. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
157. RUPA § 401(f). See id. § 403 cmt. 3.
158. Remark by judge William C. Gardner, Uniform Commissioner from Washington,
D.C.
159. 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991).
160. d. at 20.
161. See RUPA § 103(b).
162. Id. § 103(b)(2).
163. Id. § 103(b)(3).
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not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable."', 64 Third,
the agreement may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care."' 165 Fourth,
the agreement may not "eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing,"'16 6 "but the partners by agreement may determine the standards
by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the
standards are not manifestly unreasonable."'1
7
Controversies about whether rules are default rules or mandatory rules
arise primarily because different policy conclusions can be reached by
different people. A libertarian, free-market oriented policy maker is likely
to suggest that all the rules governing the relations among partners should
be merely default rules and that partners ought to be held to whatever
bargain they negotiate. 6 A more parentalistic policy maker, on the other
hand, is more inclined to support mandatory fiduciary duties, especially
to protect minority partners.
RUPA adopts an approach that does not satisfy fully the purists on either
side of the debate. Libertarians fault RUPA for failing to include provisions
analogous to two recent additions to the Delaware limited partnership act:
(c) It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of part-
nership agreements.
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner has duties
(including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited
partnership or to another partner (i) any such partner acting under
a partnership agreement shall not be liable to the limited partnership
or to any such other partner for the partner's good faith reliance on
164. Id. § 404(c).
165. Id. § 103(b)(4).
166. Id. § 103(b)(5).
167. Id. § 404(e).
168. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 129, § 6.07, at 6:68: ("Fiduciary duties are
essentially part of the standard form contract that governs partnerships in the absence of
contrary agreement .. ") That is a narrow view of fiduciary duties which finds some support
in recent case law. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988), in whichJudge Easterbrook stated: "Because the fiduciary
duty is a standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties would agree to if they dickered
about the subject explicitly, parties may contract with greater specificity for other arrange-
ments." Id. at 436. On the other hand, Judge Easterbrook's opinion, and the dissenting
opinion of Judge Posner, have been described as unprecedented:
The definition of fiduciary obligation articulated in the Jordan opinions appears to be
literally unprecedented in prior Anglo-American caselaw. The opinions define fiduciary
obligation as the court's guess about what the parties would have agreed to, had they
bargained over the matter. To the extent that the Jordan opinions suggest that this
definition is anything other than a novel departure from prior caselaw, the representation
is not accurate.
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J.
879, 885.
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the provisions of such partnership agreement, and (ii) the partner's
duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in
a partnership agreement.1 6
9
Parentalists, on the other hand, complain that RUPA has taken far too
sharp a turn toward the libertarians. For example, it has been suggested
that a partner's right of access to partnership books and records should
never be varied by agreement 70 Perhaps the fact that neither extreme is
satisfied fully indicates a balanced approach that legislators will recognize
as a reasonable compromise on a difficult issue.
NATURE AND TRANSFER OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
NATURE OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
RUPA's relative simplicity regarding the nature of partnership property
is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the benefits of an entity ap-
proach. Section 203 states simply that "[piroperty transferred to or other-
wise acquired by a partnership is property of the partnership and not of
the partners individually."' 7'
Tenancy in Partnership Abolished
The shift to an entity model permits RUPA to discard completely the
confusing tenancy in partnership of the UPA. UPA section 24 provides
that every partner has "rights in specific partnership property."'' 72 UPA
section 25(1) elaborates by stating that each partner "is co-owner with his
partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partner-
ship." 17 These statements reflect an aggregate conception that each part-
ner is a direct owner of an undivided interest in the partnership business,
including its assets. UPA section 25(2), which describes the "incidents of
this tenancy," however, denies the individual partners the incidents of
ownership of partnership assets. By process of elimination, the incidents
of ownership that are taken from the partners are left in the partnership.
Stated simply, the UPA's tenancy in partnership reaches an entity result
but insists on stating that result in aggregate terms. RUPA abandons the
tenancy in partnership to reach an entity result that is stated in entity
169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (Supp. 1992). It is significant that Delaware permits
a partner's duties to be restricted in a limited partnership agreement, but not eliminated.
Cf RUPA § 103(b); but see Georgia Limited Liability Company Act § 14-11-305(4) (fiduciary
duties of members and managers may be eliminated by agreement, without limitation), Ga.
H.B. 264, 142d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1993).
170. RUPA § 103(b)(2) bars only the unreasonable restriction of a partner or former
partner's access rights. See Model Act § 16.02 (mandatory inspection rights).
171. RUPA § 203. See generally Edward S. Merrill, Partnership Property and Partnership
Authority Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, infra p. 83.
172. UPA § 24(1).
173. Id. § 25(1).
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terms. All reference to a partner's rights in specific partnership property
is eliminated. In order to emphasize the change from prior law, section
501 expressly provides that "[a] partner is not a co-owner of partnership
property" and has no transferrable interest in partnership property. 74
Closely related is section 502, which makes clear that a partner's trans-
ferable interest in the partnership is analogous to a share of stock: "The
only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner's
interest in distributions. The interest is personal property.' 75
Property Acquired in the Name of the Partnership
RUPA enhances certainty regarding when property is acquired by the
partnership and thus becomes partnership property. First, it sharply dis-
tinguishes property acquired "in the name of the partnership" from other
partnership property. 17 Property so acquired is conclusively deemed to
be partnership property, thereby promoting reliance on record title.' v7
The certainty of subsequent transfers of partnership property also is en-
hanced by clear rules when the partnership holds record title.17 8 The pro-
tection afforded by record title to both the partnership and third parties
is extended to cover personal property as well as real property. 79
Under section 204(b), "[p]roperty is acquired in the name of the part-
nership by a transfer to (1) the partnership in its name; or (2) [to] one or
more partners in their capacity as partners in the partnership, if the name
of the partnership is indicated in the instrument transferring title to the
property."' °8 0 Thus, if property is acquired and held in the name of the
partnership, the partnership's interest can be ascertained from the record.
Property Not Held in the Name of the Partnership
Property also may be partnership property even if it is not acquired in
the name of the partnership. First, property is partnership property if
174. RUPA § 501. RUPA § 402 reaffirms that partners are cut off from particular part-
nership assets, even assets they contribute, by providing that no partner has a right to receive
a distribution in kind. Similarly, no partner can be forced to accept a distribution in kind.
175. Id. § 502.
176. Id. § 204.
177. Id. § 204(a)(1).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 185-240 (transfer of partnership property).
179. UPA § 8(3) provides that real property may be acquired in the partnership name,
but is silent regarding personal property.
180. RUPA § 204(b) (emphasis added). RUPA focusses on whether the instrument of
transfer to the partnership, such as the deed or certificate of title, indicates the correct
partnership name. That focus becomes critical in the rules governing the transfer of part-
nership property from the partnership, because transferees cannot ascertain the partnership's
interest from the record unless the partnership name is correct. RUPA yields to the state's
general conveyancing law when minor variations occur, such as a slight misspelling. Id. § 104;
see R.G. PATRON, III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.76, at 344 (1952).
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acquired in the name of "one or more partners with an indication in the
instrument transferring title to the property of the person's capacity as a
partner or of the existence of a partnership but without an indication of
the name of the partnership."'' 8 1 As among the partners, either indication
evidences an intention that the property is being acquired for the part-
nership. It also alerts third parties who check the record of a potential
partnership interest in the property.
Second, even if the instrument transferring title to one or more of the
partners does not indicate their capacity as a partner or the existence of
a partnership, the property nevertheless may be partnership property.
Section 204(c) presumes that property belongs to the partnership if it is
acquired with partnership funds. 8 2 If partnership funds are not used to
acquire the property, it is presumed to be the separate property of the
named partners, even though used for partnership purposes.' 8 Both pre-
sumptions are rebuttable. Ultimately, as among the partners, their inten-
tion controls whether the property belongs to the partnership or to one
or more of the partners. The presumptions apply when the partners have
failed to express their intention. 8 4 The easiest way to prevent disputes is
to acquire partnership property in the name of the partnership.
TRANSFER OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
RUPA rewrites many of the rules governing the transfer of partnership
property. The changes are designed to enhance certainty and convenience,
especially in the transfer of real property, and to afford third parties
greater protection in dealing with partnerships. First, RUPA modifies the
general rules in the UPA 85 on the agency authority of partners.186 Second,
RUPA modifies the special rules in the UPA 87 concerning the transfer of
partnership property. 8 8 Finally, RUPA introduces a completely new system
for filing voluntary statements concerning the authority of partners and
the status of their relationship. 89
Partners' Agency Authority Generally
The general agency authority of partners under RUPA is basically the
same as under the UPA, with several minor changes. Under section 301,
each partner has both actual and apparent authority to bind the partner-
181. RUPA § 204(a)(2) (emphasis added).
182. That continues the presumption of UPA § 8(2).
183. RUPA § 204(d).
184. See id. § 204 cmt. 3.
185. UPA § 9.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 190-204.
187. See UPA § 10.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 205-216.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 217-240.
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ship in carrying on the partnership business in the usual way.' 90 A partner's
actual authority may be expanded by the partnership agreement to include
extraordinary matters outside the partnership's usual course of business
or it may be restricted as to ordinary matters.' 9'
RUPA clarifies and slightly expands the scope of a partner's apparent
authority. UPA section 9(1) provides that a partner has apparent authority
for carrying on in the usual way "the business of the partnership." 192 RUPA
section 301(1) adds "or business of the kind carried on by the partner-
ship."'9 3 This codifies the so-called English rule, which enhances the pro-
tection of persons dealing with a partnership unfamiliar to them.' 94
If a partner's actual authority is restricted, 195 the partner still may have
apparent authority to bind the partnership, unless the other party "knew
or had received a notification" of the lack of authority. 96 That is a subtle
change from UPA section 9(1), which provides that the partnership is not
bound if the other party has "knowledge" of the lack of authority. 19 7
Under RUPA, the term knew is confined to actual knowledge, which is
cognitive awareness.9 8 Under the UPA, on the other hand, the term knowl-
edge also embodies a species of implied knowledge and thus is more akin
190. RUPA § 301(1) provides that "each partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business."
191. A partner's act outside the usual course of business is not binding on the partnership
unless the partner has actual authority. See id. § 301(2). As a general rule, the burden is on
the other party to establish the partner's actual authority to act beyond the usual course of
business. See, e.g., Stone v. First Wyo. Bank, N.A., 625 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1980); Chelsea
Nat'l Bank v. Lincoln Plaza Towers Assocs., 461 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), aff'd,
462 N.E.2d 130 (N.Y. 1984); Burns v. Gonzalez, 439 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). The
partnership is bound, however, by a filed statement of partnership authority granting a
partner extraordinary authority. See RUPA § 303(d).
UPA § 9(3) sets forth a list of acts deemed extraordinary as a matter of law, thus requiring
unanimous partner consent. The list includes such obviously extraordinary acts as disposing
of the good-will of the business (i.e., a sale of the business), as well as acts that might be
rather inconsequential (e.g., submitting a partnership claim to arbitration). RUPA leaves those
determinations to be made on a case by case basis.
192. UPA § 9(l).
193. RUPA§301(1).
194. SeeJuDsON A. CRANE & ALAN R. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 49, at 276 (1968).
195. A partner's authority may be restricted in the partnership agreement or by action
of a majority of the partners.
196. RUPA§301(1).
197. See also UPA § 9(4) (act in contravention of restriction on authority not binding on
persons having "knowledge" of the restriction).
198. RUPA § 102(a). The RUPA concepts and definitions of knew, notice, and a notification
are drawn from U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-(27) (1990). They were edited to improve clarity and
style, but no substantive change from the U.C.C. meanings is intended. See RUPA § 102 cmt.
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to the RUPA concept of notice.19 Therefore, despite the similarity in lan-
guage, RUPA provides greater protection to third persons dealing with
partners, who may rely on the partner's apparent authority absent actual
knowledge or notification of a restriction. 200 In this regard, RUPA effects
a slight reallocation of the risk of unauthorized agency power in favor of
third parties. That is consistent with notions of the expanded liability of
principals since the UPA was drafted.
RUPA attempts to balance its shift toward greater protection of third
parties by providing several new ways for partners to protect themselves
against unauthorized actions by a rogue partner. First, the partnership
may notify a third party of a partner's lack of authority.20' Such notification
is effective upon receipt, whether or not the third party actually learns of
it.2" 2 More significantly, the partnership may file a statement of partnership
authority restricting a partner's authority. 20 3 As discussed infra, third par-
ties are deemed to know of a restriction on a partner's authority to transfer
real property contained in a properly recorded statement. 20 4
Rules for Transfer of Partnership Property
UPA section 10 contains a number of confusing rules governing the
transfer of partnership real property. RUPA section 302 rewrites those
rules to add clarity and certainty, using the key concept of property held
in the name of the partnership.20 5 RUPA also extends the coverage of the
rules to titled personal property and other property acquired by an in-
strument of transfer evidencing the partnership's interest.20 6
Partnership property held in the name of the partnership may be trans-
ferred by an instrument executed by any partner in the partnership
199. Compare UPA § 3(1) (a person has "knowledge" of a fact when he or she has "knowl-
edge of such other facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith") with RUPA § 102(b)(3) (a
person has "notice" of a fact when he or she has "reason to know it exists from all of the
facts known to the person at the time in question"). Under RUPA, a person also has notice
if he or she knew or had received a notification of a fact. See RUPA § 102(b)(1), (2).
200. Absent actual knowledge, third parties have no duty to inspect the partnership agree-
ment or inquire otherwise to ascertain the extent of a partner's actual authority in the ordinary
course of business, absent actual knowledge even if they have some reason to question it.
See RUPA § 301 (1) (partnership bound unless third party knew or had received a notification
that partner lacked authority; notice insufficient).
201. Id. §§ 303(a)(2), 304.
202. See id. § 102(d) (a notification is effective when it is duly delivered at a person's place
of business or at any other place held out by the person as a place for receiving communi-
cations).
203. See id. § 303(a)(2).
204. See id. § 303(d)(2). Non-partners are not deemed to know of other limitations on a
partner's authority contained in a filed statement of authority, and thus they are not bound
by them. See id. § 303(f).
205. See id. § 204.
206. Id. § 302(a)(2).
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name.2 0 7 If the partnership wants to recover the property on the ground
that it was transferred by a partner without authority, the partnership has
the burden of proving that the partner executing the instrument of transfer
lacked authority.208 Whether the partner had authority is determined under
the usual partnership agency rules, subject to the effect of a statement of
partnership authority. 0 9 Therefore, every partner has authority to transfer
partnership property in ordinary course transactions, unless the transferee
knows of a restriction on the partner's authority.21  A transfer not in the
ordinary course, however, must be authorized by the other partners.21'
The rules are somewhat different for the transfer of partnership prop-
erty not held in the name of the partnership. If title is held in the name
of one or more of the partners, the property may be transferred by the
partners in whose name it is held.2 12 It makes no difference whether there
is an indication in the record of their capacity as partners or the existence
of a partnership.
The rules for avoiding unauthorized transfers of property held in the
name of one or more partners differ, however, depending on whether the
record reflects a possible partnership interest in the property. If there is
an indication of the partner capacity of the titleholders or of the existence
of a partnership, the partnership may recover the property by proving
that the transfer was unauthorized.2 1 3 If the transfer is in the ordinary
course of the partnership's business, the partnership must prove that the
transferee knew of the partner's lack of authority to execute the instrument
of transfer. 21 4 If the title does not reflect a possible partnership interest,
the partnership also must prove that the transferee (if for value) knew it
207. Id. § 302(a)(1). To be property held in the name of the partnership, the instrument
transferring title to the partnership must be in the partnership's name or indicate the name
of the partnership, if title is held in the partners' names. See id. § 204(b). If property is held
in the name of the partnership, transferees always may ascertain the partnership's interest
from the record.
208. See id. § 302(b)(1)(i). To recover from a remote transferee for value, the partnership
also must prove that the remote transferee knew the initial transfer from the partnership
was unauthorized (or received a notification thereof). Id. § 302(b)(1)(ii). A partnership is
barred from recovering the property once it has passed through the hands of a transferee
with good title. See id. § 302(c).
209. See id. § 301; see also infra text accompanying notes 217-226.
210. See RUPA § 301 (1). A transferee also is bound if he or she receives a notification of
a restriction on the partner's authority, even if it does not actually come to his or her attention.
See id. §§ 301(1), 102(e); see also supra text accompanying notes 185-204.
211. See RUPA § 301(2).
212. See id. § 302(a)(2), (3).
213. Id. § 302(b)(1).
214. See id. § 301(1). A notification of the partner's lack of authority would also suffice.
See id.; see also supra notes 190-191.
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was partnership property. 215 This additional requirement affords transfer-
ees greater protection than under the UPA. 21 6
Effect of Statement of Partnership Authority
Use of Statements Generally
RUPA provides for a regime of voluntarily filed statements containing
certain basic information about a partnership, such as the agency authority
of its partners.2 1 7 Because of the informality of many partnerships, and
the inadvertence of some, mandatory filings were deemed inappropriate
and in some cases impossible. It was the Drafting Committee's belief,
however, that filings would become routine for sophisticated partnerships
and would be required by lenders and others for major transactions. 21 8
An effective filing system for partnerships is one of RUPA's significant
contributions. The use of public statements brings to partnership affairs
a greater degree of certainty than was possible under the UPA. Not only
does reliance on filed statements provide greater protection to those doing
business with the partnership, but it also affords the partnership greater
protection against a partner's unauthorized acts. Finally, filed statements
are more convenient and less costly than the cumbersome practices used
under the UPA to ensure that partners acting on behalf of a partnership
have the authority to do so, especially with respect to the transfer of real
property.2 19
To be effective, statements filed on behalf of the partnership must be
executed by at least two partners.2 20 This is a compromise between the
security of requiring all or a majority of the partners to sign and the
convenience of a single signatory. A copy of all statements filed must be
sent promptly to all partners and persons named as partners in the state-
ment.22 ' To be effective with respect to real property, a certified copy of
the statement also must be recorded in the office for recording transfers
of real property.22 2 In most states, that will mean recording in the county
215. RUPA § 302(b)(2).
216. Cf UPA § 10(3) (no proof required that transferee knew property was partnership
property).
217. See RUPA § 105(a) (eschewing a mandatory filing system in favor of a voluntary
system).
218. See id. § 105 cmt. 1.
219. For example, third parties often require that a deed or mortgage be executed by all
the partners or that an affidavit of authority be executed and recorded.
220. RUPA § 105(c). A single partner may execute individually and file a statement on
his or her own behalf. To be effective, the partner must declare personally, under penalty
of pcrjury, that the statement is accurate. Id. §§ 105(c), 303(c).
221. Id. § 105(e). Failure to send a copy to every partner, however, does not limit the
statement's effectiveness. Id.
222. See id. § 105(b).
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where the real property is located. Statements may be amended or can-
celed,2 23 and the accuracy of any statement may be denied.
22 4
Statement of Partnership Authority
The most important goal of the statement of partnership authority is
to facilitate real property transfers. The statement must include the names
of the partners authorized to execute instruments transferring real prop-
erty held in the name of the partnership.2 25 The scope of a statement of
authority is not limited, however, to real property transfers. The statement
also may include the authority, or limitations on the authority, of any
partner to enter into other transactions on behalf of the partnership, as
well as "any other matter" the partners choose to include.
2 26
Because all partners have at least apparent authority to transfer part-
nership property and otherwise bind the partnership in ordinary course
transactions, a grant of authority in a statement is most significant if it
bestows extraordinary authority on a partner. Otherwise, it merely dupli-
cates the default authority rule. Similarly, a limitation of authority in a
statement is significant only if it restricts a partner's authority to act in
ordinary course transactions. Under RUPA, the legal effect of a statement
of authority differs depending upon whether the transaction involves a
transfer of real property held in the name of the partnership, or whether
it is a transaction not involving the transfer of real property.
Effect on Transfer of Real Property Held in the Name of the
Partnership
The effect of a properly recorded statement of partnership authority is
virtually absolute with respect to the authority of a partner to transfer
real property held in the name of the partnership. 27 This is consistent
223. Id. § 105(d). Unless earlier canceled, a statement of authority is canceled by operation
of law five years after the date on which the statement, or the most recent amendment, was
filed. Id. § 303(g).
224. Id. § 304 (statement of denial).
225. Id. § 303(a)(1)(iv). The statement also must include: (i) the name of the partnership;
(ii) the address of its chief executive office and, if any, of at least one office in the state; and
(iii) the names and addresses of all the partners or of an agent from whom a list of partners
may be obtained. Id. § 303(a)(1), (b). Naming the partners is a "disclosure tax" on the privilege
of filing a statement of partnership authority. Failure to name the partners does not affect
the validity of the statement. Id. § 303(c).
226. Id. § 303(a)(2).
227. The execution, filing, and recording of statements is governed by RUPA § 105. To
be effective, a statement granting or limiting a partner's authority to transfer real property
must be recorded in the office for recording the transfer of the real property that is being
conveyed. Id. § 303(d)(2), (e). To be effective, the statement recorded must be a certified
copy of the statement filed with the Secretary of State. Id. § 105(b). This is to prevent conflicts
between statements. Statements may be amended and canceled. Id. § 105(d). A partner or
a person named as a partner who believes a filed statement is erroneous may file a statement
of denial. Id. § 304. A statement of denial operates as a limitation on the authority granted
in the original statement. Id.
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with the policy supporting reliance on record title involving real property.
A recorded statement of authority has no effect on the authority of a
partner to transfer partnership real property not held in the name of the
partnership. 28 In that case, a search of the record would not disclose the
partnership's interest in the property.
With respect to real property held in the name of the partnership, RUPA
makes the authority conferred on a partner in a properly recorded state-
ment conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without actual knowl-
edge to the contrary. 229 Thus, a grant of extraordinary authority to transfer
real property outside the ordinary course of the partnership's business is
binding on the partnership, even if the partner executing the instrument
of transfer in fact has no authority, unless the transferee knows the partner
lacks authority.
A statement of authority is, however, a two-way street. Under RUPA,
third parties are conclusively deemed to know of properly recorded lim-
itations on a partner's authority to transfer real property held in the name
of the partnership.2 30 Third parties thus have constructive knowledge of
such restrictions and are bound, under the general rules governing a part-
ner's agency authority, even if the transfer is within the ordinary course
of business.
The conclusive effect of a recorded grant of authority is, however, sub-
ject to a recorded limitation of authority.2 3' In effect, conflicting statements
of authority cancel each other out. In that case, third parties may not rely
on the record, but must ascertain from other sources the extent of a
partner's actual authority.
Effect on Non-Real Property Transactions
A filed statement of authority has a more limited effect in other trans-
actions that do not involve the transfer of real property, such as the transfer
of partnership personal property or the execution of a contract on the
228. RUPA contains no positive statement to this effect. It is the negative implication of
reading § 303(d)(1), which deals with grants of authority "except for transfers of real prop-
erty," and § 303(d)(2), which deals only with grants of authority to transfer real property
held in the name of the partnership. Section 303(e), which deals with limitations on a partner's
authority to transfer real property, also is effective only with respect to property held in the
name of the partnership.
229. RUPA § 303(d)(2). Where a recorded statement conflicts with the authority granted
in another statement of authority, such as a recorded statement of denial, it operates as a
limitation on the authority granted to the extent of the conflict and destroys the presumption.
In that event, third parties may not rely on the record and must find another way to establish
the actual authority of the partners to convey the property. See id. § 304.
230. See id. § 303(e).
231. See id. § 303(d)(2), which provides that a grant of authority is conclusive "so long
as and to the extent that ... a limitation on that authority is not then of record." A statement
of denial, as well as a conflicting statement of authority, may operate as a limitation on
authority for that purpose. Id. § 304.
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partnership's behalf. In those cases, the effect also differs depending on
whether the statement is a grant of extraordinary authority or a limitation
of authority.
A filed grant of authority is conclusive in favor of a person who gives
value without knowledge to the contrary.2-11 That binds the partnership,
thereby protecting third parties who rely on the record.
Except for transfers of real property held in the name of the partnership,
third parties are not deemed to know of a filed limitation on a partner's
authority. 33 Apart from the transfer of real property, the effectiveness of
a filed limitation on a partner's authority is determined by the general
rules on the authority of partners. Section 301 provides that third parties
are not bound by a limitation on a partner's authority, unless they actually
know (or have been notified) of the limitation.2 3 4 Thus, a statement re-
stricting the authority of a partner has no limiting effect, except in the
case of real property transfers, other than as a potential source of actual
knowledge to third parties who search the record.
Because they are not bound, third parties dealing with a partner do not
need to monitor the partnership's filings in order to protect themselves
against unknown restrictions (except in real estate transactions). To require
parties dealing with the partnership in everyday commercial transactions
to check the record continually would be inefficient. In those cases, the
risk of a rogue partner exceeding his authority is better allocated to the
partnership.
Effect of Statement of Dissociation and Statement of Dissolution
RUPA contains two important exceptions to the general rule that third
parties are not deemed to know of a filed limitation on a partner's au-
thority, other than to transfer real property.23 5 RUPA provides that third
parties are deemed to have notice of a statement of dissociation 36 and a
statement of dissolution 23 7 ninety days after they are filed. 238 Thereafter,
both statements operate to limit a partner's apparent authority to bind
232. Id. § 303(d)(1). As in the case of real property, the binding presumption of authority
is subject to a limitation contained in another statement then of record. See supra note 229.
233. RUPA § 303(f). To some extent, this might deter third parties from searching the
record because ignorance is rewarded.
234. Id. § 301(1).
235. RUPA § 303(f) provides that a third party is not deemed to know of a filed limitation
on authority "except as provided in ... Sections 704 and 805."
236. See RUPA § 704; see also supra text accompanying notes 24-40.
237. See RUPA § 805; see also supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
238. See RUPA §§ 704(c), 805(c). If properly recorded, those statements operate imme-
diately as a limitation on the partners' authority to transfer real property held in the name
of the partnership. Id. § 303(d). After filing a statement of dissolution, the partnership may
file a new statement of authority specifying those partners who may transfer real property
during the winding up period. Id. § 806(d).
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the partnership, even if the other party does not actually have notice of
the partner's dissociation or of the partnership's dissolution.2 39
The greater impact of those statements on the rights of third parties is
justified by the likely visible effects of a partner's dissociation or the part-
nership's dissolution-alerting those dealing with the partnership to in-
quire or to check the record. The partners' need for a relatively prompt




Article 9 is new and authorizes the conversion and merger of partner-
ships.2 4 1 Because conversions and mergers were unthinkable under the
aggregate theory, it is not surprising that the UPA is silent on the subject.
Today, however, partnership conversions and mergers are quite common,
although the absence of statutory authority in most states makes their
validity and legal consequences unclear.2 42 RUPA provides much needed
239. Unless a statement of dissociation is filed, a dissociated partner has lingering apparent
authority for two years if the third party does not have notice of the partner's dissociation
and reasonably believes he or she still is a partner. Id. § 702(a); see also supra text accompanying
notes 92-95. Likewise, after dissolution, the partners' usual apparent authority continues
unless the third party has notice of the dissolution. RUPA § 804(2); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 96-100.
240. The cost of the partners' enhanced protection, however, falls on third parties dealing
with the partnership who must check the record at least every 90 days to be assured that a
partner's authority has not been limited by dissociation or dissolution. See RUPA §§ 704,
805.
241. Id. §§901-902.
242. At least 14 states authorize the merger of limited partnerships. See Craig B. Smith,
Limited Partnerships-Expanded Opportunities Under Delaware's 1988 Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 89 (1990), for a chart comparing the attributes of
each state's limited partnership act. In addition to the ten states shown in the chart, four
more states authorized the merger of limited partnerships. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15678.1
(West 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 359.1 (1986), as amended, Laws 1993, S.B. 66 & 20, West
No. 146; VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.48:1 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 25.10.800 (West 1991). Seven jurisdictions authorize cross-entity mergers of limited part-
nerships and other business entities, such as corporations, business trusts, or limited liability
companies. In addition to the three jurisdictions shown in the chart, the new Missouri,
Virginia, and Washington statutes, supra, and Texas authorize such cross-entity mergers. See
TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.1 1(a) (West 1992). In addition to Missouri and Texas,
Delaware authorizes the merger of limited and general partnerships. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 17-211 (Supp. 1993).
Only one state authorizes the conversion of a general partnership to a limited partnership.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.11:1 (Michie Supp. 1993). Four states authorize the conversion
of a general partnership to a limited liability company. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-212(a)
(1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 359.777 (1986), as amended, Laws 1993, Mo. S.B. 66 & 20, West
No. 146; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1010.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-47(a)
(Supp. 1993).
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certainty as to their validity and clear answers to basic questions about
their legal effect.
SAFE HARBOR
Article 9 is merely a "safe harbor." Its requirements are not mandatory,
and a partnership may convert or merge in any other manner provided
by law.2 43 If the requirements of Article 9 are followed, a partnership
conversion or merger is legally valid and has the effect provided in the
Act. As a result of the added comfort to lawyers rendering opinion letters
regarding the validity of partnership conversions and mergers, it is likely
that Article 9 will be followed in most cases.
244
CONVERSIONS
RUPA authorizes the conversion of a general partnership to a limited
partnership and of a limited partnership to a general partnership.
2 45
Effects of Conversion
A converted partnership is the same entity that existed before the con-
version.2 46 This avoids an unwanted and unnecessary dissolution of the old
entity and the creation of a new entity, thereby preserving the benefits of
a continuing entity. Specifically, upon the effective date of the conversion,
all property owned by the converting partnership remains vested in the
converted entity. 2 47 Likewise, all obligations of the converting partnership
243. See RUPA § 908. In states where the limited partnership act authorizes the conversion
of a limited partnership to a general partnership or the merger of limited and general
partnerships, those procedures may be followed. Common law conversions and mergers of
general partnerships still are possible.
244. The requirements of Article 9 are subject to modification in the partnership agree-
ment. See id. § 103(a). The "safe harbor," however, is available only if the requirements of
Article 9 are followed, unless modification in the partnership agreement is invited expressly.
For example, RUPA § 902(b) permits the voting requirements for approval of a conversion
to be fixed in the agreement.
The application of Article 9 is not limited to the conversion and merger of domestic
partnerships. See id. § 906(b). That is because it often is unclear where a partnership is
domiciled, and under RUPA a partnership generally can select the law to govern its internal
affairs. See id. §§ 103(a), 106 cmt. No harm appears likely to result from extending the right
to convert or merge under local law to foreign partnerships. Whether the conversion or
merger of a partnership is recognized by another jurisdiction depends on the law of that
jurisdiction.
245. See id. §8 902, 903. RUPA § 901 provides four definitions especially for Article 9,
including the terms general partner, limited partner, and limited partnership. The term partnership
is restricted to its general statutory meaning of a general partnership. See id. § 101(4). As
used in Article 9, the term partner includes both general and limited partners. Id. § 901(4).
246. See id. § 904(a).
247. Id. § 904(b)(1). Because title remains vested in the converted entity, no further act
or deed is necessary.
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continue as obligations of the converted entity.2 48 Actions and proceedings




In a so-called "upstream" conversion of a general partnership to a lim-
ited partnership, the terms of the conversion must be approved by all the
partners unless the partnership agreement specifically authorizes a con-
version by a lesser vote.2 50 In a "downstream" conversion of a limited
partnership to a general partnership, the conversion must be approved by
"all the partners," notwithstanding a provision in the partnership agree-
ment purporting to authorize a lesser vote. 25' That includes all the limited
partners.2 52 The mandatory unanimity requirement reflects the Confer-
ence's caution in according deference to partnership agreements in the
relatively novel context of partnership conversions. It was believed that a
limited partner should not be at risk of having his or her status changed
to that of a general partner, with its attendant personal liability, without
actual consent, despite a contractual provision to the contrary.2 53 This also
is consistent with the traditional rule that one does not become a partner
without consenting to the substance of the relationship.2 54
Personal Liability of Partners After Conversion
A general partner who becomes a limited partner by conversion remains
liable as a general partner for all obligations incurred by the partnership
before the conversion.2 55 Thereafter, the partner's liability is that of a
limited partner, with one narrow exception.2 56 The newly minted limited
partner is personally liable for any obligation incurred within ninety days
after the conversion takes effect if the third party reasonably believes that
248. Id. § 904(b)(2).
249. Id. § 904(b)(3). This means the action or proceeding may be continued in the name
of the converting partnership. The style of the case may be changed to reflect the name of
the converted entity.
250. RUPA § 902(b) provides that a conversion "to a limited partnership must be approved
by all the partners or by a number or percentage specified for conversion in the partnership
agreement." A general voting provision in the partnership agreement will not satisfy that
requirement.
251. RUPA § 903(b). The partnership may, nevertheless, be converted based on the vote
specified in the partnership agreement, but the conversion will not qualify for "safe harbor"
treatment. Id. § 908.
252. See id. § 901(4).
253. See id. § 903 cmt.
254. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 194, § 5, at 39.
255. RUPA § 901(e).
256. See id. § 902(e).
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partner still is a general partner.2 5 This conforms to the general rule
imposing lingering liability on all dissociated partners. 258 In effect, third
parties transacting business with the partnership after its conversion are
deemed to have knowledge of a limited partner's status ninety days after
the certificate of limited partnership is filed. 259 Of course, a partner be-
coming a limited partner can protect against any lingering personal liability
by immediately notifying partnership creditors of his or her limited partner
status.
Upon the conversion of a limited partnership to a general partnership,
a former limited partner who becomes a general partner is personally liable
only for obligations incurred after the conversion takes effect. 260 Thus, for
obligations incurred by the limited partnership before the conversion, the
new general partner's liability generally is limited to his or her investment




RUPA expressly authorizes the merger of a general partnership with
one or more general or limited partnerships. 26 2 The RUPA provisions gov-
erning partnership mergers are similar in most respects to corporate
merger rules. The terms of the merger, and the manner and basis of
converting the interests of each party to the merger into interests or ob-
ligations of the surviving entity, must be set forth in a plan of merger.
26 3
The surviving entity may be either a general partnership or a limited part-
nership. 26
4
257. See id. § 902(e). The merger takes effect when the certificate of limited partnership
is filed, unless a later date is specified. Id. § 902(d).
258. See id. § 703(b).
259. The certificate of limited partnership must set forth the name of each general partner.
See RULPA § 201(a)(3).
260. See RUPA § 903(e). A conversion takes effect when the certificate of limited part-
nership is canceled. Id. § 903(d). Thus, a converted limited partner is treated the same as a
newly admitted general partner. See id. § 309.
261. See RULPA § 303(a). A limited partner theoretically may become personally liable if
he or she participates in the control of the business, but only to creditors who reasonably
believe, based on the partner's conduct, that he or she is a general partner. Id.
262. RUPA § 905(a).
263. Id. § 904(b). Partnership interests may, instead, be converted into money or other
property, in whole or in part. Id. § 905(b)(5).
264. Id. § 905(b)(3). The former partners of the partnerships being merged may continue
as partners of the surviving entity or they may be dissociated incident to the merger. See id.
§ 906(e). If the surviving entity is a limited partnership, the continuing partners may be either
general partners or limited partners. In that case, the plan of merger must specify the status
of each continuing partner. Id. § 905(b)(3).
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Effects of Merger
When a merger takes effect, 26 5 the separate existence of every partner-
ship that is a party to the merger (other than the surviving entity) ceases.2 66
At that time, all property owned by each of the merged partnerships vests
in the surviving entity.2 67 All obligations of every party are thereafter ob-
ligations of the surviving entity.268 Actions and proceedings then pending
against each party to the merger continue as if the merger never oc-
curred. 269
Approval of Merger
The plan of merger must be approved by all the partners of each general
partnership that is a party to the merger, unless a lesser number or per-
centage is specified in its partnership agreement for the approval of merg-
ers.2 70 The plan also must be approved by all the partners, general and
limited, of a limited partnership that is a party to the merger, notwith-
standing a provision to the contrary in the partnership agreement, unless
the law under which the limited partnership is organized specifically re-
quires otherwise for mergers.27'
Personal Liability of Partners After Merger
Following a merger, a general partner of the surviving entity is personally
liable for any pre-merger obligation for which he or she was personally
liable, as well as all post-merger obligations of the surviving entity. 272 The
general partner is not personally liable for the pre-merger obligations of
a party to the merger for which he or she was not personally liable, such
as the obligations of the merging partnerships of which he or she was not
265. A merger takes effect on the later of (i) the approval of the plan by all parties to the
merger, (ii) the filing of all documents required to be filed as a condition of the merger, or
(iii) any effective date specified in the plan. Id. § 905(e).
266. Id. § 906(a)(1).
267. Id. § 906(a)(2).
268. Id. § 906(a)(3). If the surviving entity is a foreign partnership, the Secretary of State
is constituted its agent for service of process to enforce any obligation of a domestic part-
nership that is a party to the merger. Id. § 906(b). The purpose of this rule is to make it
more convenient for local creditors to sue a foreign surviving entity when the credit was
extended to a domestic partnership that disappeared as a result of the merger.
269. Id. § 906(a)(4). The surviving entity may be substituted as a party to the action or
proceeding. Id.
270. Id. § 905(c)(1).
271. Id. § 905(c)(2). RULPA does not contain a special voting rule for mergers. See RULPA
§§ 302, 405 (partners' voting rights governed by partnership agreement). RUPA does not
defer to the limited partnership's contractual voting provisions because of concern regarding
a limited partner becoming liable as a general partner without actual consent. See RUPA
§ 905 cmt.
272. RUPA § 906(c).
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a general partner. 273 A limited partner of the surviving entity has no per-
sonal liability, unless he or she also was a general partner of a party before
the merger.
274
The surviving entity is liable for all pre-merger obligations of every party
to the merger and all post-merger obligations.2 75 Therefore, every partner
of the surviving entity, general or limited, is liable for all obligations of
the surviving entity at least to the extent of the partner's interest in that
entity. 27 6 The general partners of the surviving entity also are personally
liable for all post-merger obligations and for the pre-merger obligations
of the partnership of which they were a general partner.
277
A former partner of a constituent partnership who does not become a
partner of the surviving entity is deemed dissociated as of the effective
date of the merger.2 78 Unless otherwise provided in the plan of merger,
that partner's interest must be purchased by the surviving entity in the
same manner as a buyout under Article 7,279 and that partner's lingering
agency power and continuing liability for post-merger transactions is the
same as a dissociated partner's.
280
Statement of Merger
After a merger, the surviving partnership may file a statement of
merger.2 81 Once the statement is filed and, in the case of real property,
recorded, all property that before the merger was held in the name of a
party other than the surviving entity becomes property held in the name
of the surviving entity for the purposes of the partnership property transfer
rules.212 Under section 302, every partner has the authority to transfer
273. See id. § 906(c)(1), (3).
274. See id. § 906(c)(2).
275. Id. § 906(a).
276. If any pre-merger liabilities of a constituent partnership are not satisfied out of the
property of the surviving entity, the former general partners of that partnership must con-
tribute the amount necessary to satisfy that party's obligations. See id. § 906(d).
277. Id. § 906(c).
278. Id. § 905(e).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 87-95.
280. See RUPA § 906(e). A statement of dissociation may be filed in connection with the
merger, with the same effect as provided in §§ 703 and 704.
281. Id. § 907(a). The statement must contain the names of the surviving and disappearing
partnerships, the address of the surviving entity's chief executive office and local office, if
any. and whether the surviving entity is a general or limited partnership. Id. § 907(b).
282. See id. § 907(c), (d). Section 907(e) is a savings provision. If the statement of merger
fails to contain all of the information required by subsection (b), the statement still will have
the operative effect provided by subsections (c) and (d) if it is executed and declared to be
accurate pursuant to RUPA § 105(e). It must correctly name the party to the merger in whose
name the property was held before the merger, thereby preserving the integrity of the record.
44 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 49, November 1993
property held in the name of the partnership, subject to the effect of a
limitation in a statement of partnership authority.2 83
CONCLUSION
RUPA represents a major overhaul of the venerable UPA. Perhaps its
greatest contribution is the complete reworking of the law of partnership
breakups. The old concept of dissolution is abandoned. Partnerships that
contracted for stability now find great support in the statute. Partnerships
that have not contractually anticipated their own breakup now have a
complete set of readily understandable default rules. On the other hand,
RUPA continues most of the major policies in the UPA, and rejects the
arguments of those who pressed for more extreme changes to the law of
partnership. For example, RUPA rejects the argument that the law should
be changed to deny partners at will their historic right to liquidate. Sim-
ilarly, RUPA rejects the argument that the fiduciary duties of partners
should be mere default rules. Instead, RUPA reflects a more traditional
approach while at the same time attempting to facilitate private ordering
of the wide range of relationships now called partnerships.
283. The surviving partnership may file and record an amended statement of partnership
authority granting or restricting the authority of partners to transfer partnership property.
See id. § 303; see also supra text accompanying notes 225-234.
